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Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Harry Wilson
By Mary Anne Chute Lynch
Harry Wilson was one of four senior advisers to the US Department of the Treasury during the
Obama administration and served on the President’s Task Force on the Auto Industry, which
was established in 2009 and charged with providing aid to General Motors and Chrysler, and
later to other entities, to avoid their disorderly failure and the loss of a million or more jobs.
The Auto Task Force worked intensively throughout 2009 to swiftly negotiate with the
corporate leadership, unions, investors, and other stakeholders of the two manufacturers to
design an orderly restructuring that would put the companies on a path to stability. Wilson led
the government’s efforts regarding General Motors while it went through its bankruptcy and
restructuring. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Wilson.
Leaders need to be laser-focused on solving the problem long term, which requires
them to hire needed experts and keep politics from muddying the waters.
We asked Wilson about his general views on what makes for a successful team in considering
the auto rescue.
In terms of the leaders, you need folks who are laser-focused on solving the problem.
There’s too much political debate around blaming somebody else or the other side. . .
Anytime we go through a restructuring, I always make the point: it doesn’t matter
how we got here. We need to understand it. We need to fix it. But the most important
thing is, what do we do from here? Instead of spending time blaming the past, it’s
much more focused on where we are and what we do to fix it.
The first thing is having a solution-oriented mindset and a fact-based approach, a
desire to collaborate rather than attack in a two-party system, having people with real
expertise in certain areas and the ability to bring in outside expertise in areas they
don’t know—that’s essential. On the task force, it’s a combination of domain-specific
knowledge and a commitment to long-term success. If you don’t have domain-specific
knowledge, it’s hard to really make a contribution.
We have unbelievable pockets of expertise across the U.S. and the world . . . Tapping
into that for task-force members is valuable, and folks with that expertise must be
willing to focus on long-term success. That is . . . an essential, essential combination.
Wilson commends the leadership—Steven Rattner, Tim Geithner, and Larry Summers—for
setting the tone as they did; focusing on long-term success and bringing out the best in every
member of the team was essential. “They deserve incredible credit for establishing a very
healthy and successful culture for each of us,” he said.
With a small team, a Herculean task, and short time span, make a plan and divide and
conquer.
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Harry Wilson was one of four leaders of the President’s Auto Task Force working closely with
the Department of Treasury. According to Wilson, because of their small size, planning and
efficiency were critical in saving the auto industry:
We were a nimble team because we were small. We had a lot of work to do . . . We
mapped out what needed to be done and who would be able to do the work. Secondly,
we developed a game plan and the key items we had to assess . . . President [Barack
Obama] made the decision to move forward with the restructuring of General Motors
and a potential sale of Chrysler, with a very short timeframe to get it done. As a result,
we divided and conquered. I took responsibility for the General Motors restructuring
and the suppliers.
Wilson quickly became known for his assiduous analysis of data and facts as he led his “deals
and diligence team” taking GM through its bankruptcy.
In a crisis, for the experts to be most effective, you have to build trust rapidly. Being
open and transparent, listening to all approaches, and brainstorming will usually
surface the best solutions.
The sheer volume of work streams facing the Task Force in a short period of time was very
demanding, Wilson said. From the beginning, it was important for the ad hoc team to
establish a pattern of interaction that would allow them to be most effective. Wilson
described this dynamic:
We had a great, healthy, robust debate around [the future of Chrysler]. One of the
great things about our team is we worked well together. We didn’t always agree, but
we disagreed respectfully and thought through things together, collaboratively.
Wilson further shared that his approach was to get as much out of people as possible, which
was a challenge operating with a team that had no history. Openness and civility provided a
framework for maximizing everyone’s contributions, said Wilson:
In all of the negotiations, if people could articulate a better rationale, we were all ears.
There was no pride of authorship, no sacred cows . . . If someone’s got a better idea,
let’s understand it, let’s turn that way . . . I find that approach tends to breed trust
because it’s very transparent; you’re very clear about each of the issues.
It allows people to feel comfortable voicing their opinions, and aggregating things
from the other side of the table. I ended up being a big believer in it—brainstorming,
coming to a better solution . . . We found that transparency leads to better and more
ideas.
[…] You want to get as many smart people as possible who can contribute to the topic
in the room with you and have a real exchange of ideas. It's important to have that
framework and that process, so if you don’t feel comfortable, you can get increasingly
comfortable with time, contributing your best ideas.
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[…] I’m biased probably because I’ve seen it work. At this point, 27 years, I’ve seen
different approaches in negotiations that are exploitable—people who bluster,
people who hold the cards close to their chests, people who just like to talk, to just
listen. I think in a situation where you have extremely important decisions to make in
a very short period of time with people who have not worked together previously,
you have to build trust rapidly. The only way to do that is to be transparent and open.
You can talk about being trustworthy, but unless people see that and believe it, they’ll
never open up.
Notably, Wilson emphasized that he and the Task Force used the same approach when
negotiating with GM and its stakeholders: “There were [often] disagreements on both sides.
If one side liked the deal, the other side didn’t, but that never ended a deal. . . we were
[usually] able to strike a balance that no one love[d], but [which] was the best path.”
Pay attention to the tradeoffs when negotiating. At the end of the day, employees must
feel valued, but employment terms must also be competitive for the rescue and
business to succeed.
Wilson’s father was a bartender, and his mother was a Greek immigrant who worked in
textile factories. His family suffered first-hand the consequences of factory closings and job
losses when he was young. Because of this, he brought a sense of empathy to the high-level
work of the Task Force, which included assisting GM in renegotiating its labor contracts that
were generally thought to be out of step with its competitors and a factor in the company
becoming less competitive. He discussed how choices were made to minimize job losses but
still position the company for success:
You want to have a work force that is valued, but you also want them to be
competitive relative to the company’s direct peers. That’s a balance, and when we
ended, wages were competitive, benefits were less generous.
[...] Had there been more aggressive reductions made, would they have passed in a
ratified labor agreement? Probably not . . . Part of the reason General Motors has been
so successful in the last 11 years [since the bankruptcy] [is] because you’ve got a
pretty motivated workforce that’s really been investing in transforming the business
. . . I personally have a philosophy of wanting to do the right thing for all the
stakeholders, and sometimes there are tradeoffs, but you have to be conscious of
those tradeoffs instead of just imposing an onerous labor agreement or whatever it
is.
It may be enticing to replace corporate executives and board members in failed
companies, but many details should be considered before deciding to do so including
when the government’s role should end.
According to Wilson, leadership at GM and Chrysler had allowed their companies to fail
under their watch, which is why the Task Force replaced them. But, he said, they were very
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deliberative in making those decisions and considered just what the role of the government
should be in supporting the company:
It was a tough issue we had to wrestle with. Fritz [Henderson] was the obvious
successor internally (at GM), and the real debate became between Fritz and someone
external. There was a little bit of cost-benefit analysis, and we all thought Fritz was
solid, and the person who’d be able to transport General Motors [to success], no
question . . . The chance that GM gets someone [external] who’s a real superstar, who’s
up to this task was very low.
[…] We believed strongly that good corporate governance is an essential ingredient
for long-term success and good decision-making and checks and balances in the
corporation. It became very clear there needed to be substantial change in the board
and senior management. Then the question becomes, is that enough, or is there a need
to do more? We had a great series of discussions around that. I was concerned that
would not be enough; that GM, once it was through bankruptcy, even with these
changes, that the cultural problems that had been significant and ongoing, would
become even more significant without a push to be successful. . . But Larry Summers
was of the view that if we do that, we are going to be overstepping our authority. Even
though it’s taxpayers’ money . . . there’s a limit to what we should do. We should set
the company up to succeed, but not be involved post-closing. Whether I agree with
that or not, as we talked it through, I came to that same view. Larry was very
thoughtful . . . If we were more engaged post-closing, that would make it mostly
political.
Structuring the financial side of positioning the company for success requires
considering the practicalities that exist, how much taxpayers’ money has to be
invested, and a plan for recovering that investment. Keep politics out of it.
Wilson discussed how the Task Force “spent a lot of time to ensure the company would not
need to restructure a second time . . . We wanted the company to succeed in the long-term.”
A significant issue was deciding how much capital the “New GM” that would emerge from the
bankruptcy would need, which was particularly challenging because of GM’s poor cash
controls. This, said Wilson, led Treasury to “out of necessity and concern, put in a little bit
more capital than we thought might be necessary.”
Another major challenge, said Wilson, was deciding how to structure that funding:
Even if the company could get back to where it was, it still had too much debt to be
able to best innovate, grow, attract talent, et cetera. I thought [starting the new
company with a huge debt load] defeated the whole purpose of what we were trying
to do, which means, not only avert a humanitarian crisis, but also set these companies
up to succeed.
Wilson explained that in a purely private-sector deal, “you would never put $50 billion in
General Motors.” But he concluded that a government equity investment would be the best
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solution. “This was an anathema to some people who think about governance and supports
and loans,” he described, “but the whole purpose was, how do we help the company succeed.”
With the government’s equity investment, GM had a much healthier capital structure and
much less financial risk going forward, Wilson explained.
_____________________________________
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